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Abstraksi: Perbincangan sekiar hubungan politik dan agama di Ind'onesia
senantizsa nrcrrcntpatkan klam pada posisi ydng sangat signifi'kan. kbagai
dgaffM mayoritas, Islam berperan penting dakm mrnnttukan warara politik
yang fukembangdi Ind,onesia. Hal ini antara hin ampak pada perkembang-
an Nahdktul Ukma Q,{U), organisasi Islam wfuar di Indon'esia yang brdiri
pada OZe. Dakm sejmah Ind.onesia, NU ikut mmerttukan rl)arnauacana
politik di Indnnesia. Berbagai upaya tekb dilzkukan kalangan NU untuk. meru"
muskan bubungannya dengan strukturpolitik dan negara.
Artikel ini mmduknpsikan satu dinamika dakm tubuh NU dakm rang-
ka mmrmuskzn posisi organisasi tersebut di tmgah berbagai perubahan poli-
tik yang teqadi dalam sejarah Indonesia. Mulai dari keputusan NU untuk
keluar dari partai politik Masyumi pada 1952, keputusan untuk ikut dalam
pemilu 1955, perdebatan tsnta.ngasas negara di konstituante, dukunganpa"da
Presiden Soekanro, dukungan pada Orde Baru, bubungan d'engan PPP (Par-
tai Peratuan Pembangr.ruzn)-gabungan dari partai-partai Iskm-masalah
Pancasik sebagai asas tungal, sampai naiknya Abdurrahman rX/abid' sebagai
presidm kl; Semua siknp NU terhadap penstiwa'peristizaa di aws jeks'jelas
mrngandung strd.tegi dan visi politik tertmtu
Meski demikian, momrn paling peltting bagi NU dalam merumuskan
ztisi politiknya adakb keputusan kongres NU di Situbond'o pada 1994. NU
saat itu men)tatakan menarik. diri dari politik praktis dan kembali mmjad'i
organisasi sosial-keagamnan. Keputusan itu, yang dikmal dmgan "kembali
ke kbittab 25", kemudian mmjad.i kndasan penting bagi perumusan orien'
tasi intelektual dan politik NU seknjutnya. Kalangan NU pod" dasarnla
memiliki penafsiran yang beragam terbadap makna "khittalt" tersebut. Bagi
sebagizn kTai dan politisi N(J, keputusan tersebut rnentpakan kesempaan
mereka untuk, mmjalin bubungan dmgan Golkar dnn rezim Soebarto guna
memperoleh keuntungan politik. Semmtara bagi intelektual dan aktift muda
59 Studia klamiha, VoL 7, No. 2,2000
Robin L. Bwb
N(J, keputusan Muktamar Situbondo telab menciptakan ruang lebib lrcbas
untuk mmjadi oposisi pemerinah dtngan zaadah informal yangtidak mudah
dikoopasi, seperti kelompok kojio, dan LSM.
Namun demikian, lepas dari berbagai penafsiran di atas, hal terpenting
untuk dicatat adakb bahzpa "kembali ke kbitub 26" tampaknya lebih ber-
fungsi sebagai sebuah strategi NU dzlam merumuskan pisi dan agenda poli
tik mereka. Keputusan tersebut bahkan dapat dtpahami sebagai "instrumsn
politik" NtJ dalam mmjauab suasana politik yang berkembang saat itu'
Jika sebelumnya mereka bupolitik memakai pangung partai politik-yak-
ni PPP- maka sej ak khrttah, NU berpolitik "tanpa pangung. " Artiny a, NU
berpolitik dengan tidak. mmggwnakan strukturformal polttik seperti partai
politik, melainkz.n berpolitik di luar kerangkapolitik negara. Dengan demiki-
an NU dapat dengan leluasa memberdayakan kesadaran politik di tingkat
grass-roots d.engan kegiatan-kegiatan adpokasi dan kegiatan semacam LSM.
Makna politis d"ari khittah 25 rersebut selanjutnya bisa dilibat pada
perkembangan NU kemudian. Pada era reformasi setelab kejatuhan Orde
Baru, seiring dengan dibukanya kran kehbasan politik, Tparga NU ikut
dakm euphoria politik dengan mmdirikan partai politik PKB-di sam-
pingsebagian mend.irikan PKU, PNU dzn SLINI, dzn sebagian kgi masih
tetap dzlam PPP. Keterlibatan mereka dalam partai politik di atas berarti
melibatkan N{J kembali dalam kancab politikformal. Meskipun secara struk-
tural N(l ti.dak terikat dengan partdipartai politik, keterlibatan kalangan
NIJ yang intensif-Pa1rp",n sebagai pendiri partai-partai politik-menjadi-
kan keduanya sulit dipisahkan. Lebih knjut, bal itu sekaligus membuktikan
bahua politik praktis pada dasarnya merupakan bagian inheren dari struk-
tur budayaNU.
Bila demikan, sikap kntis terhadap n4ara, bersamaan dengan isu toleran-
si, keterbukaan, dzn pemMdayaan masyarakat-yang disuarakan pada masa
kepemintpirun AMutrahrnaan Wahid.-hanya meuakili kzkngan elit w-
tcntu dalarn tubub Ntl. Kongres NU di Lirboyo pada Nopember 1999 klu,
semakin membuktikzn kond.isi demikian. Dalam kongra tersebut, NU mert'g-
hasilkzn hfuapa keputuwnyang jelas'jeks L,ertmungan dengan gagasan ke-
terbukaan dan toleransi di atas, Sekin nzeneapkan kembali kkm sebagai azas
organisasi, mmgantikan Pancasila, Mukamar NU juga mengharamkznpe-
laksanaan ibadah fuwma pemeluk agama kin, dan mntgharamkan non'
Muslim menjad.i pemimpin negara. Mmgamati hasil keputusan Mukumar
terebut, maka barapan terhadap peran NU dakm pmtbmtukan civil society
di Indonesiz umpaknya patut dipertanyakan. Baltkan, sangat mungkin bah-
rpa gagasan-gagasan di aus lebih merupakan "akt politik" kalangan elit NU
untuk kepent ingan kekuasaan.
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bservers of Islam and Muslim politics in Indonesia over
the past year could not fail to note the explosion of polit-
ical parties bearing the banner of Islam as well as the re-
emergence of a discourse on a "political Islam" and the specter of
an Islamic state that became a subject of anxiety among some and
enthusiasm among others. This was hardly a new issue-Indone-
sians have struggled since even before the formation of their state
ro negoriate the relationship between Islam and the srare. Indone-
sia's founding fathers, upon developing its Constitution, were
mired in the debate over the role of Islam and the syari'ab in their
new nation. This issue raised its head time and time again at key
points during the Soekarno regime-as discussed below. soeharto
irtificially muted the potential political role of Islam through en-
forcemenr of asas tunggal Pancasilal and careful balancing of Islam
with the military. Almost immediately after Soeharto fell, howev-
er, there was an explosion of political parties bearing the banner
of Islam, and the discourse on the shape of the new Indonesian
political system was dominated by the debate over the role of Is-
lam.
One of the primary actors in the struggle over the relationship
between Islam and the state has been the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU-
literally, Revival of Religious Scholars). NU, with between 30 and
40 million members constituting the world's largest Muslim orga-
nization, was formed in 1926 with the purpose of fostering and
maintaining the traditions and practices of the largely rural, Java-
based ulama that constirute its backbone. NIJ's position on the
role of political Islam in Indonesia has pluctuated throughour its
history 
-a flucruation that will be rraced in this paper. since 1984
however, under the leadership of Abdurrahman'$flahid, NU has
developed a reputation for strongly opposing a formal role for
Islam within the political strucrure. Thus the election of \rahid
ro the highest possible position within the formal political struc-
ture, thai of President, has important implications not only for
the direction of NU to the furure, but also of the relationship of
Islam and rhe srate in a political system which is undergoing tran-
sition. This paper will argue that \rahid's active opposition to a
..political Islam,' does not reflect an NU-wide view on this issue,
but is a relatively new and possibly even minority position, and
indications 
^re 
th^t its current popularity may be undergoing
change.
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NU in the time of the Old Order:
Shaping Political Orientation
In 1952, the withdrawal of NU from Masyumi2 and the establish-
ment of its own political party signified the formal splitting of the
modernists and traditionalists3 for the first time since Indonesia's in-
dependence in 1945. This split sremmed from ideological, theologi-
cal, and sociological differences that had existed for decades, howev-
er by formalizing these differences within political organizations, a
chasm between these two 'streams' of Islam was created that was to
remain to this day.a Interestingly, however, although the organiza-
tional lines remain the same, rhe essence of their political thought
and positions have reversed themselves. In the 1950's NU strongly
advocated a political expression for Islam, and pushed for appoint-
ments of Muslim ministers, called for an Islamic basis to the srare,
and expressed suspicion of relationships with the ril/est. In compari-
son, Masyumi at this time did not request specific posrings for Mus-
lims and actively sought expanding ties with the \ffest (Madinier and
Feillard, 1999: 17;Fealy 1998:170). These positions were ro reverse
themselves during the New Order period, as will be discussed later.
In7952 a raging battle took place within NU irself between ulama
who wanted NU to establish itself as a political partf > and those who
felt it should remain an organ:zation focused on religious and social
issues. That NU was going to withdraw from Masyumi was fairly
obvious, but strong argumenrs were made by \fahid Hasyim, son of
NU founder Hasyim Asy'ari, and at the time general chairman of
NU, that NU had strayed far from its true purpose of promoting
social and religious traditions and its involvement in the political
world had brought it nothing but detriment (Fealy 1998: 98). These
arguments were countered by 'STahab Chasbullah, one of NIJ's
founders, and Rais Aam5 from 1947-1951, who led the faction calling
for NU to take a strong political role by establishing its own party,
precisely in order to maintain its religious inreresrs (ibid). The dy-
namics of this debate were to repeat themselves at leasr twice more in
NU history, once in the early 1980s when NU made its historic Khit-
tah'26 decision, and then again over the past year, with the develop-
ment of PKB and the election of Abdurrahman \flahid to the Presi-
dency of Indonesia.6
In L952 the politicians won that debate, seming NU on a course ro
take a surprisingly large win in the 1955 elections-with 18o/o of the
vote taking third place nationally. NU had established itself as a p<_r-
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litical force to be reckoned with by quickly and effectively mobiliz-
ing its huge electoral base into a political machine. As a result of its
strong showing in this election NU was able to secure control over
the Department of Religion, as well as a solid presence in parliament.
NU's political stance during the remainder of Soekarno's regime was
marked by accommodationism and flexibility, more than any other
time in its history-a stance which was roundly criticized as political
opportunism at the time.
In the latter half of the 1950s, increasing pressure from separatist
movements and growing dissatisfaction with the party system led to
attempts by Soekarno to establish "Guided Democracy".T \While NU
,h"r.d Masyumi's fundamental opposition to this move' on the basis
of its clear threat to Islam and party Power, at each step along the
way, such as the formation of the Dewan Nasional (I'{ational Coun-
cil) and Kabinet Karya, NU ultimately conceded to Soekarno, while
Masyumi did not.8 This cooperation with Soekarno' in the face of
earlier professions of Muslim solidarity and in spite of the obvious
authoritarian results of these moves, was not without intense inter-
nal debate within NU. In the end however, NU leaders argued prag-
matically that all-out opposition to Guided Democracy would mere-
ly resuk in NU being excluded completely from the cabinet and struc-
tures o{ political power, and they felt they would have more influ-
ence from within, even within this authoritarian system. Further-
more, NIJ received substantial funding for its Pesantren from the
state, and this as well as the futures of tens of thousands of NU civil
servants serving in the bureaucracy were dependent upon good rela-
tions with the government (Fealy 1998: 189).
Masyumi's support of the PRRI seParatist effort and general op-
positional stance throughout the 1950s resulted eventually in Soekar-
no dissolving the party in 1960. PBNU during this period distanced
itself from Masyumi, in a purely self-preservational move' a stance
which was strongly opposed by NU branches at the provincial and
district level.t Finally, however, PBNU overcame this resistance from
the branches and maintained its position of accommodation with the
Soekarno regime (ibid, 204).
In the context of overall NIJ accommodation during this period,
NU put up more of a fight within the Konstituante, the Constituent
Assembly which met from 7956-1959, and which was charged with
drafting a new constitution. Embedded within this task, and the source
of the ho,,.rt polemic in the Konstituante, was the decision on wheth-
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er the state was to have an Islamic or "secular" basis, the latter sym-
bolized by the Pancasila. Islamic leaders insisted that the state be based
on Islam, a stance NU supported for the first rwo years of this peri-
od. Lev points out rhe complicated relationships this issue spawned,
as he notes that in parliament NU was much closer in political orien-
tation to PNI (Irtrational Party of Indonesia) than ro Mas1,umi, its
"Islamic ally" in the Konstituante (Lev 1966:8). NU and seven orher
Muslim parties formed a 'Muslim block' within the Konstituanre,
which demanded that the original Jakana Charter be returned ro rhe
Preamble of the consritution.l0 In 1958, after a couple of years of
debate on this issue with no resolurion achieved, NU leaders began
to feel that the debate was eroding public supporr for the parties, and
actually giving weight ro Soekarno's aurhorirarian tendencies (Fealy
1998:210).
In 1959 Soekarno called for a rerurn ro rhe 1945 Constitution,
which initially NU opposed uncompromisingly-both because it
would accord Soekarno disproportionare power in their eyes, and
because of the Jakarta Charter's non-inclusion in it. After much ne-
gotiation, Idham Chalid, NU's chair ar the time, agreed to endorse
Soekarno's position, on the basis of argumenrs that by making this
concession NU would be able to extracr commitments from Soekar-
no to maintain the exisrence of the parliament and Konstituante (ibi^d:
211). Lev views this move more cynically, arguing that NU was in
essence being blackmailed by threats to bring various party leaders
up on charges of corruption (Lev, 1966:246). At any rare, this move
infuriated NU regional branches , nearly causing an internal "coup",
and ultimately PBNU's decision was reversed (ibid.:335). In s.rbie-
quent voting sessions in the Konstituante, NU refused to back down
and give the government rhe two-thirds majority it needed ro rein-
state the 1945 constitution, in spite of barely veiled threats that rhe
alternative was military control (ibi.d:339). The issue was, again, rhe
status of the Jakana Charter, with NU insisting that it be included
within the text of the Constitution, which Christian and secular
groups could not accept. Finally, in frantic last minute maneuvers,
NU let it be known that it would accepr the reinstatemenr of the
1945 Constitution by decree, which then took place on July 5,h. by
making this concession, NU had to accept the Jakarta Charrer's non-
inclusion in the Constitution, with merely a srarement by the gov-
ernment that the Jakarta Charter was a "historical document" influ-
encing the Constiturion-a srarus which did not provide for state
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implementation of the syari'ah. This ultimate cooperation, however,
secured NU representation in the new structures of power such as
the Kabinet Kerja and Gotong Royong parliament, gave them the
coveted Minister of Religious Affairs appointment, and, with the ul-
timate demise of Masyumi, meant that NU was the only major Islam-
ic party in the new government (Fealy 1998: 222).
Fealy argues that a major backlash within NU against its accommo-
dationist policies took place in the early 1950s, though this criticism
came from two separate sources with conflicting agendas. One group
of influential ulama wanted NU to withdraw from politics and return
to its roots as a social and religious organizatio n (ibid.: Ta).The second
group wanted NU to remain active in politics, but argued for a less
acquiescent role, and specifically sought NU to take a stand against the
strengthening Communist Party (PKI). Pan of this effort was the es-
tablishment of Banser, a para-military unit ostensibly designed to pro-
tect party activities, but according to Fealy, in effect galvanized as an
anti-PKI force (ibid;237).Throughout 1964 and'65, NU members and
Banser increasingly became involved in conflicts with PKI over land-
reform, sometimes resulting in violent clashes.
In the chaos of the period of transition from the Old Order to the
New Order NU was internally divided and unclear on its own posi-
tion. Banser and Ansor, the NU young men's organLzatior1 cooperat-
ed closely with the Army and were deeply involved in the mass kill-
ings of 1965, while senior NU leaders known to be close to Soekarno
went into hiding (Feillard 1996: 45). Conflicting edicts were issued,
some urging members to remain loyal to Soekarno, others condemn-
ing Soekarno's pro-communist affiliations and pledging support to
Soeharto. Eventually Subchan ZE and other young-generation leaders
prevailed over the older ulama and committed NU to installing Soe-
harto as President, and forming an alliance with the Army (ibid; a9).
NU in the Time of the New Order:
Redefining Political Islam
Almost from the beginning of the New Order, however, fissures
appeared in this NU-army alliance. Feillard describes conflicts over
several issues, from the date and system of the approaching elections
to anti-party bills proposed by the army, which ultimately pushed
NU into exchanging the accommodationist stance it had taken with
Soekarno for an oppositional stance toward the New Order (ibid:54-
6a). The issue of the relationship of Islam or the syari'ah to the state,
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and the debate over the Jakarta Charter was another contentious point
of conflict between NU and the regime during this time. Between
1966-1968 NU along with other Muslim organizations tried on sever-
al occasions to get the Chaner integrated into political institutions as
a source of law, however by late 1968 Idham Chalid, the general
chairman (ketua T anf tdziy ah) of NU f r o m 19 5 5 -I9 82, had persuaded
more Islamist elements in NU to drop the debate for the sake of their
standing with the government.
In 1,973, Soeharto, in an attempt to reduce Islamic opposition,
among other things, combined all the Muslim parties into a new par-
ty, the PPP(United Development Party), and the non-Muslim par-
ties into PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party). Chalid, for his cooper-
ative stance, was rewarded with the prestigious but somewhat unin-
fluential position of President of the party.In spite of this, NU con-
tinued to play a more and more oppositional role as the 1970s pro-
gressed. By the late '70s, NU was often engaged in head-on conflict
with the government, and in the 1977 elections, NU-affiliated PPP
candidates experienced physical attacks from Golkar-affiliated'thugs'
(Bruinessen 1994: 7a5).
In 1979Idham Chalid faced severe internal criticism from NU at
its Semarang Congress, for his apparent lack of advocacy on behalf of
NU within PPP. He made a public apology however, and was rein-
stated as head of NU in 1979. Shortly afterwards however, conflicts
between NU and PPP's modernist leader Jaelani Naro sharpened,
resulting in the extreme marginalization of NU politicians within
PPP. 'When Chalid still did nothing to protest, an even fiercer strug-
gle took place between his supporters, the "Cipete" group, and those
who wanted him removed as head of NU, the "Situbondo" group.11
After a struggle spanning several years, the Situbondo group was able
to gain the upper hand in the conflict, eventually installing its choice
of leadership for NU-the Achmad Siddiq-Abdurrahman lVahid team,
at NIJ's Situbondo Congress tn 7984.12
Two momentous decisions were made at this Congress, which
completely altered the course of NU. The first decision was to accept
the Presidential proposal in which al| organizations or "sosio-politi-
cal groups" must adopt the Pancasila as their asas tunggal (primary
ideological foundation).13 This initiative was actually aimed largely
at Islamic groups, as \Tilliam Liddle explains, "the government per-
ceived Islam as the only social force not yet brought to heel, not yet
fully willing to accept the governmert's notion of where authority
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ultimately resides," (quoted in Ramage 1995:36)' Islamic opPosition
to asds tu'nggal was sr;ong, and within NU opinions were divided on
the subject. Achmad siddiq, who was elected as Rais Am at this con-
gress, was able to convince the ulama that the Pancasila was actually
iot in.ompatible with Islam, thus clearing the way for NU to be-
come the first Islamic organization to accept asas tungal'la
The second momenrous decision made at the 1984 Situbondo
congress was rhe decision to withdraw NU from formal politics.
This decision, known as "kembali ke Khittah 1926" and referred to
hereafter as Khittah '26, espoused a return to a focus on social and
religious, as opposed to political, issues. It had been discussed serious-
ly ui.r.. the tgTg Semarang Congress, and was part of a progressive
igrnd^of reform promotedby Siddiq and \7ahid, among others' \What
.I".tly Khittah '16 
^r^nt was, unsurprisingly, 
interpreted different-
lv bv differenr currenrs within NU, and it was sufficiently vague in
wording itself that even to the present day there is little consistent
"g...-J.t, on what Khittah '26 actually means. According 
to Kyai
Iluchid Muzadi, Kyai Siddiq's secretary, and himself a member of
the .,Majelis 24" (counc tl of 2a) which created original fo-rmulations
of Khittah '26,th.edocument was meant to be a platform for NU, for
the first time setting out in writing NU's mission and vision and the
religious teners upon which these were based (interview, oct 23, L999).
Kembali ke Khittah' 26, f.o r malized inDecision 02IMNU-27 / 19 8 4,
was composed of nine points which laid out NU's religious purpose,
the theoiogical tenets Lpon which its purpose was based, its social
agenda, its organizational function and role of the ulama within it,
"nd irr relationship with the 
state and nation (Kbtttah NU' 1985).
The majority of the documenr was unexceptional in that it merely
placed into one compact statement the primary religious and social
,"n.a, that NU adhered to, and that were commonly known and
widely accepted. There were three points, however, which were re-
-"rk"bl. in that while presented in the form of a restatement of
fundamental and unchanging principles, they in fact effected a change
in direction for NU: Point 6a-NU would rerurn to its original pow-
er srmcrure in which the role of the ulama within the Syuriah super-
seded the role of the Tanfidziyah; Point 5 b,c, and d-NU would
emphasize programs and activities relating to education, religious ed-
,r."^rion, 
"nd so.ial well-being; 
and Point 8- NU no longer was to
have organizationalties of any form to political organrzatrons (ibid).
The firsi two of these points work together to emphasize withdrawal
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from politics and emphasis on "social" activities. The third point while
it appears to be working toward a similar end, actually contains a
more complicated intention and has resulted in a fair amounr of con-
troversy.
The first of the three points mentioned above refers to a prevail-
ing sentimenr among NU members that NU had, ro its detriment,
shifted away from its original balance of power berween its two-
pronged leadership srructure in which the Syuriah, composed of se-
nior ulama, held ultimate authority within NU, and the Tanfidz-
iyah, as its name suggests, managed purely administrative affairs. In
the decade preceding Khittah '26, as has been discussed, the techno-
crats and officers of the Tanfidziyah, who were for the mosr parr not
religious leaders or ulama, had gained preeminenc e (Muzadi 199+,
90). This happened because during N{J's years as a political parry,
these "politiko" amassed a great deal of personal and political power,
which they implemented by frontrunning NU's high-profile politi-
cal stance (Tebba L993: 73). Thus the desire to reinstate rhe suprema-
cy of the ulama is clearly intertwined with the desire to leave the
arena of formal politicking in favor of a renewed emphasis on educa-
tional, social and religious affairs.ls Not only was it felt that the ne-
glect of "social" affairs was resulting in a lack of development within
NU, but also that NU's oppositional stance was becoming increas-
ingly costly, politically and economically. \7ith the Ministry of Reli-
gion removed from NIJ control in I97I, its political influence was
lessened; at the same time the government cut off much of its devel-
opment and educational aid to NU members in retaliation for their
oppositional stances. It was felt, therefore, rhar NIJ's "period of pol-
itics" was benefiting only a small elite ro rhe detriment of rural ulama
and santri (Muzadi 7994: xi).In addition, some felt that one implica-
tion of a return to supremacy of the ulama and to a concentration on
religious affairs was also a return to a more "traditional" religious
orientation, specifically reinscribing rhe value of "bermadzhab", or
relying on the collective wisdom of the Sunni tradition rather than
personal interpretation of the scriptures (ibi.d: 59). Thus in some ways
Khittah '26 resonared with a more conservarive, 'hardline' position
of NU during the 1940s and 5Os.
In terms of the first two points discussed above, there is wide-
spread feeling that point one, rhe return of the supremacy of the
ulama, has not actually taken place, and the technocrats and admin-
istrators of the Tanfidziyah still hold primary power within the or-
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ganizatiofl (da 1999:69).16 More success has been had in achtevtng
point two, the refocusing of NU toward social and religious as oP-
posed to politically oppositional activities, which has seen the rein-
statement of some government assistance. As a result of Khittah '26
implementation of programs for pesantren-based community devel-
opment and education, legal aid assistance, entrePreneurship-promo-
tion, and the like have begun (Bruinessen L996: tll;\iloodward 1989:
r39\.
The implementation of the third point mentioned above howev-
er, the disassociation of NU as an organization with formal politics,
has been the subject of widespread discussion and controversy. At its
most practical and immediate level, this point meant the withdrawal
of NU from membership within the PPP (United Development Par-
ty)-which many observers interpreted as NU exercising revenge on
the thenleader of PPP, Jaelani Naro, who, as discussed earlier, was
attempting to limit NIJ's power within his party (interview with
Muchid Muzadi, Oct.23, 1999). As Muzadi explains, this supposed
"withdrawal" from politics was in fact a political tool which released
NU politicians from their association with PPP and freed them up to
strengthen ties with Golkar and pro-regime political figures. This
had immediate and practical benefits not only to individual pesantren
which received government funding, but to NU's political standing
as a whole (ib"l).
Thus one argument is that Khittah '26was a political instrument
enabling NU to shed its oppositional image and integrate itself into
the prosperous and powerful ranks of the Golkar inner circle. A case
can be made, however, that Khittah'26 had precisely the opposite
intention. and effect.
According to this argument point eight of Khittah '26 was an re-
sponse to the increasingly limited "ruanggerak" (room to maneuver)
permitted within the New Order-defined political sphere (Muzadi
L994:xi;Bruinessen 1996; Amin 1999).It was felt that \7ahid through
Khittah'26 sought to circumvent the New Order's attempts to regu-
late political activity and political organizations through its Pancasi-
la ideology by removing itself from the political arena in order to
have more room to in fact maneuver politically. As NU intellectual
Hairus Salim has argued, "There was no formal political platform
that would have provided space for NU to rise politically. Thus, it
was equally disadvantageous for NU to stay with PPP, or to join
with Golkar or even PDI. The onlv way out, and that which was
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more strategic for NlJ, was ro conducr 'politics without a formal
platform' (politik tanpa pdnggung). This kind of politics is a politics
which does not require affiliation with formal strucrures of political
power....it can be understood as politics outside of the framework of
the state," (Salim 1999: 87). Thus by leaving the sphere of formal
politics, NU activists were free to conduct grass-roors empowerment
and advocacy activities, and political education which exposed peo-
ple to the hegemonic nature of the New Order regime.
Thus, while Khittah'26 became commonly known as the deci-
sion to "withdraw from politics", it is more accurately understood as
a political instrument, and a response ro a particular political envi-
ronment. It was a political insrrument whose effect was to diversify
the political stances and agendas of NU. In the hands of cenain kyai
and NU politicians, it was used to draw closer to Golkar and the
Soeharto regime for political or financial gain. However, in the hands
of young activists and democratic-minded intellectuals it was used to
create a space to be oppositional in informal, indirect means which
could not easily be regulated by the state. An important part of this
process was the subversion of the New Order definition of "politi-
cal". By refusing to accept the narrowly restricted, highly regulated
political sphere of the New Order, but instead being political from
outside that sphere, in what was labeled by the New Order, and NIJ,
as a "social" sphere, NU created a whole new understanding of what
was "political". Some academics and NU activists referred to this as
the difference between "formal" and "informal" politics, others re-
ferred to NlJ"s "cultural approach", but by the mid-1990's ir was
recognized that NU had all along been political, and had created a
new understanding of "political", one which " was understood as
raising the quality of life for its people, rarher than only compering
for seats in formal political institutions," (Amin, 1999: p. I42).
One important element of the redefining of "political" was the
development of a discourse on civil society within NU. Over the 15
years since Khittah '26 was first implemented, a cadre of young intel-
lectuals grew up under the leadership of Abdurrahman \7ahid, pro-
moting the idea of a critical voice outside of formal politics, ro serve
as a watchdog for the "peoples" interests. A number of NU-affiliated
NGOs or social organizations were formed during this period, such
as LkiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial; Institute for the Study of
Islam and Society), P3M (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesanrren dan
Masyarakat; Institute for the Development of Pesantren and Com-
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munity) and ISIS (Institute Studi Islam dan Sosial; Institute for the
Study of Islam and Society). These organ:zations created a netvrork
of activists and intellectuals committed to crrtrcizingthe government,
to raising awareness of democracy or the lack thereof under the Soe-
harto regime, and to advocating for the interests of small farmers and
villagers being exploited by local government. These efforts largely
the result of the group of intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid'
Masdar Mas'udi, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Muchid Muzadi, Kyai Sa-
hal Mafudz, and Nasihin Hasan who, in the late 1970s and early 1980s
spearheaded a renewal of thought on interpretations of religious texts,
and sought to make the pesantren a basis for social development. By
the early to mid 1990s the discourse had shifted from a paradigm of
pesantren-based community development, to civil society, and fo-
cused on fostering a critical political awareness among grassroots
populations. These intellectuals, and a new 'young generation' of
acrivists that grew up under their tutelage, like Ulil Abshor Abdallah
and Syafiq Hasyim, began speaking out on issues of human rights,
pluralism, and political and social justice.
One of the primary aspects of this burgeoning discourse on civil
society among these NU intellectuals and organizations was a strong
stance on the relationship between Islam and the state. Through sem-
inars, talks, articles and training sessions, these young NU intellectu-
als argued using Qur'anic texts that political aspirations and activities
of the state should not be channeled through religion, nor should
religious symbolism be used to forward political interests. This had
been a long-held conviction of Abdurrahman \7ahid, who waged an
on-going battle and debate against what he saw as the dangerous en-
croachmenr of "political Islam", or those who sought political legiti
mation by using the banner of Islam.lz
NU in the Time of the ReformationEra:
Questioning NU's Political Direction
As the 'reformasi' movement began, in early 1998, the divisions
within NU replicated the divisions during the 1965 chaos. That is,
the young generation of activists, students, PMII , Ansor, Banser as
well as the intellectuals and "civil society" component described above
were vocal and critical in protest of the regime, while older NU lead-
ers and kyai were much more careful, calling for "constiturional"
means, and a gradual process of reform rather than quick upheaval.
This divergence was expressed most strikingly at the respective Halal
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bi Halal (gathering_ traditionally held after Idul Fitri) programs heldby the Generasi M"* NU (,,young generation"_.o*ir,i"rrg of NUyouth organizations like Ansor, pMti, Fatayat, and IPNU), and thePBNU in late February. The Generasi Muda Halar bi H"i"l *r, 
"fairly 'hot'' affair-swarms of press, activists, and Banser added an
edge to the evening, as did the yeils of "New president!', from the
audience during the reading of GMNU's official sraremenr. This state-
ment itself was quite unusualry forthright, "The closed and centrar-
ized political system has shut off the possibility of criticism and con-
T:l !y the public,"..."The people ar. .xp.ri.ncing a crisis of trust(the lack thereof) in our governmenr"...ani cailed fJr immediare .,re-
form in areas of economics, politics, and cuhure,,,. Onlf 
"i-rtr. "rra,did they rather weakly tack on an acknowredgement th"t th.y ..r.-
sisted any divergence from the constitution," 1;T^dzkiroh', KeluargaBesar GMNU, 20 Februari,l99g).
This final element clearly is a concession to the .,official NlJ,, line,
expressed at the PBNU Halal bi Halar herd the nexr morning. In
striking contras-o. r.h... c-arnivar/uprising atmosphere of the riight
before, PBNU's Halal bi Halal was tor,,,".rr. rhe :o or 40 NU lead-
ers.who showed up were offered boxed snacks, and sat quietly intheir seats 
_during a short sermon by Kyai Ilyas Ruchiy"r,iollo*"d
!r th. reading of the official NU statemerrr. 'ihi, ,,",.*.* affirmed
that NU "supporrs the constitution...the nominarion of the presi-dent and Vice-president musr folrow constitutional processes and
mechanisms," and strongly forbade its members from making presi-
dential or vice-Presidential nominations outside of the fo.-"I .1".-tion procedures in effect ("Tarajji", pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ula-
ma, 20 Februari, 199s). The absence of \7ahid due to a stroke suf-
fered.on the 20,h of January, and subsequent hospitaliz"tion Jro,rghMarch' lefr the NU withour srrong leadership,'during which time
this divergence continued. Finally fnNu ."-" to a po"sition of cau-
tious reform, saying the student movement should b. r.rppon"d, but
that rather than completely doing away with th. ,yrt.-, ,l.y ,t orrta
work with in it and perfect currently existing ,*.rrrr., 1Ko*p"r,April 15, 199S p.1).
A combination of the student movemenr and international pres-
sures resuked in May 1998 in rhe eventual stepping down of soehar-to,.who passed_thepresidency on to his vicefr.s*ident, BJ Habibie.
In the months that followed, Muslim organizatiorr,loirr.dihe rest of
the nation in a frenzy of political p^nylor^ tion, and the number
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of Islam-based parties in Indonesia mushroomed from one to forty-
two, twenty of which fulfilled the requirements for panicipation in
the general elections on June 7'h. As Eep Saefullah Fatah has noted,
immediately after Soeharto stepped down, Islamic groups experienced
sense of politicization and integration, which was followed a few
months later by a phenomenon of disintegration (Fatah, L999: I0).18
The politiciz^tion and integration was perhaps most visible in the
events surrounding the Special Session of the MPR in November
1998, when a Kongress lJmat Islam was held in an effort to unify
Muslim political voice in support of Habibie, who was seen to repre-
sent modernist Islam and was expected to restore Islam to its rightful
place within Indonesia's political system. Not only did the KUI not
succeed in unifying the Muslim ummat, but Muslim political leaders
soon became disillusioned with Habibie, arguing that he did not ful-
fill the above-mentioned expectation, and citing his lack of action on
issues like Tanjung Priok and Aceh as evidence that he was not the
savior that political Islam had awaited (interview with Fadli Zon,8
Oct. 1999).
tVhat was striking was that throughout this period the discourse
on politics in Indonesia, and the attempts of politicians, intellectuals
and public figures to create a new political system, was heavily col-
ored by the debate on the role of Islam. Suddenly the possibility of
an Islamic state, and discussion of the Jakarta Charter, which had
been nearly non-existent since 1968, erupted in the media and public
discourse.lt Islamic organizations and parties saw this as their chance
to finally promote a more political role for Islam, and with the revis-
iting of the question of secular vs. religious state foundation, to re-
move once and for all the possibility of Indonesia as a secular state.
\7hile voices and stances within this general position varied, of course,
a prevailing understanding emerged, one that advocated a strongly
influential role for Islam within the political system, while stopping
short of calling for an Islamic state. As Kyai Yusuf Hasyim, chair of
the PKU (Partai Kebangkitan lJmat, one of the NU-based parties)
stated, "\7e must prevent this nation from becoming a secular na-
tion. For that reason we have a heavy responsibility to make sure
that the aspirations of the Islamic people are reflected in our legal
system," FIe went on to emphasize, however, that while he was urg-
ing Islamic parties to work together to achieve a greater political role
for Islam, he was not calling for an Islamic state. "'We are not aiming
to create an Islamic state-do not misunderstand us," he says, speak-
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ing of the PKU and of the umat Islam in general ("Indonesia Jangan
Jadi Negara Sekuler", Republika,24 March, 1.999, p.l). The line most
frequently heard from these circles is that politicailsiam in Indonesia
today is not seeking to establish an Islamic stare. but rather to inte-
grate "Islamic values" into the legislative system in Indonesia. \7hat
is meant by "Islamic values" remains unclear and often unelaborated
tpgl' but most frequently is attached to principles such as amar ma'ruf
nabi munkar (seeking the good and avoidinglh" b"d in a situationj,
rahmatan lil 'alamin (Islam as a religion of love) andfastabiqul khair.
at (outdoing one anorher in doing good). Lev argues-that the lack of
clarity on what modernists want from "political Isram" or a state
based on Islam is precisely what has allowed opponents of political
Islam to creare exrreme and frightening visions oi 
"n 
"Isl"miic state,',
and which has allowed non-modernists to dominate the debate (Lev
1972:24r). \7hile he wrote this in 1972,rbelieve it is still largely irue
today, though it may be changing with the appointment Jf yusril
Ihza Mahendra, a very modernist legal ."p.ri,-", Minister of Law
and Legislation.
NU of course, had a major stake in this debate, having put forrh a
clear position against "political Islam" for the past 15 y-earr. At th.
same time, politicians within NU saw this as a perfect opportunity to
bring NU back into formal politics. There was a gt."i d."l of de-
mand from politicians and kyai alike for NU to form a political oar_
ty-pressure which Abdurrahman vahid resisted at first, b.rt .rr"rr-
tually reading the situation that it was inevitable, he acquiesced and
became the founder and primary spokesperson, though not the for-
mal head.of, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; National Awakening
Party), which was founded on the 23'd ofJuly, 199g.
PKB however, was not the only pany to form out of the NU
"keluarga besar" (large family). PKU (partai Kebangkitan lJmar,
Awakening of the lJmmat Party), headed by yusuf Hasyim, vahid's
uncle; PNU (Panai Nahdlatul Ummat; party of the itising of the
Ummat) headed by Syukron Makmun; and sUNI ( Solidaritas Uni
Nasional Indonesia; solidarity of the Indonesian National Union),
hgaded by Abu Hasan, a rival of \7ahid's since the early r99o's. .were
all formed shortly after PKB. conflict quickly 
"m.rg.dt.tween rhesefour parties, with PKB asserting that it was the only pany to be given
"restr" (blessing) of PBNU and that the other parties were for-ed by
those who were " barisan sakit hati" ( iust jeaious because they were
not included in PKB), while the smaller parties accused pKB of un-
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fairly claiming to be the "only" NU party, a claim which they said
went against the ideals and principles of Khittah'26 (Bisri, 1998, pp.
g3-g2). This conflict reached its peak when \rahid made a very con-
troveisial remark about PKB being the egg that is laid by the chick-
en, while the other parries are rhe feces excreted by the chicken (
"Telor Ayam ala Gus Dur," Republika,2g \./.ay, 1999, p'I)'
The issue of the Islamic stare, or a more formal role for Islam
within the political system, was also wrapped up in the conflict be-
rween the four parries. suNI did not have a srrong stance either way,
but pKU 
"rrd PNU both held 
more hardline positions than PKB,
arguing for a political system which reflected the fact that Islam was
th! m"Jority ieligion in Indonesia. \7ahid and his brother, Salahud-
din \rahid,-a PKU leader, engaged in a public debate through a series
of editorials rn Media Indonesia, in which they argued over the Jakar-
ta charter and the role of vahid Hasyim, their father, in calling for
an Islamic state in Indonesia. Abdurrahman insisted that Hasyim had
always called for a state based upon Pancasila, while Salahuddin re-
ferred to documentation of Hasyim's stance during negotiations on
the Constitution of 1945 inwhich he insisted that the President should
be Muslim, and the state based on Islam (Media Indonesia,8,9, 17 and
23 October, 1998).
After months of frenzied campaigning' politicking and hype, In-
donesia,s general elections were held on June 7, t999. Despite many
public f""Is to the contrary, the campaign period, as w-eil as the elec-
tions itself, were relatively free of violence, and went fairly smooth-
ly. The results of the elections were generally endorsed as "free and
fair", despite some reports of violations, in part due to the remark-
able absence of violence surrounding rhe elections. In spite of a long
and endlessly delayed vote-counting Process' the public remained
patient 
"rrd .,r"r, 
when the results were announced, the widespread
pror"r$ that were expected did not occur. PDI-P won hands down'
ii.tr f S percent of the votes giving it 153 seats in parliament. Golkar
took second place, with 22 percent and 104 seats in parliament. PKB
came in at third, with 12 percenr of the vore and 51 seats. This was a
disappointment ro most PKB politicians, who had been strongly con-
,rin.ed that they had a chance of taking the winning spot'
In the 
-o.riht after the elections, a great deal of maneuvering,
alliance-forming and general politicking went on. Eventually a kind
of loose alliance .m.rged between the nationalist parties (PDIP and
pKB) on one side, anJ a coalition called Poros Tengah (Axis force)
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which consisted of the Muslim parties, PAN, PPP and some elements
of Golkar.2o After an on-again off-again courtship, PKB decided in
August to formally endorse Megawati Soekarnoputri as its Presiden-
tial candidate-based not only on their ideologically based alliance,
but also on the fact that Megawati legitimately won the majority
vote in the July elections. In a surprise move, Amien Rais in August
nominated Abdurrahman \ilahid as the Presidential candidate for the
Poros Tengah, which he led.21
Thus ensued a few months full of more maneuvering and specula-
tion. Vould Vahid accept the Poros Tengah nomination and run
against Megawati, the candidate of choice of his own party? Vhen
Vahid publicly accepted the nomination, in mid-August, most peo-
ple both within NU circles and in the Poros Tengah parties still doubt-
ed that he was serious. Mutual suspicion prevailed. The prevalent
theory from the Poros Tengah side was that Vahid was going to
pretend to run up until the very end, thus preventing the Islamic
parties from fielding another candidate, and at the last minute step
down, handing his votes to Megawati. From the NU side, almost no
one really trusted that the Poros Tengah was serious-they were sus-
pected of using Vahid to deflect momentum from Megawati, and of
planning to dump him at the last minute.
Meanwhile, amidst all of the suspicion and rumors, the facts re-
mained that PKB, headed by Matori Abdul Djalil, was faced with the
highly ironic situation of fielding a candidate in competition to the
founder of PKB and chair of NU. As time went on and it became
more and more apparent that Gus Dur was serious about running for
the presidency, PKB itself became highly factionalized, with some
siding with Matori's commitment to remain tme to the results of the
PKB leadership meeting in August which resulted in Megawati's nom-
ination, and others saying that it would be unthinkable for NU's
party not to nominate its general chairman. The lines of this frag-
mentation were not clean, but somewhat counter-intuitively it was
the senior kyai, who made up the Dewan Syuro (eadership council),
who wanted to stick with the PKB party decision, while many of the
younger politicians wanted to switch their candid^cy to Vahid 2'?(In-
terview with Effendy Choiri, Oct.26,1999).
The Syuriah held four different meetings to discuss the issue of
\7ahid's candidacy. Vhile they gradually became more convinced of
the Poros Tengah's sincerity, they never gave full endorsement to
Vahid. Their last meeting, on the 19'h of October, the day before the
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presidential elections, they released an official statement that was
characteristically ambivalent-they neither forbade nor endorsed
\7ahid's candidacy, but just said that they would "pt^y" for him The
more positive spin that this decision got in the press was, according
to one PKB memb er, a "creation" of \7ahid himself (Interview with
Ahmad Khaliq, Oct.2L, t999). 'What they did do at this meeting was
form contingency plans-if \ilahid didn't make it (either because Poros
Tengah or'Wahid himself withdrew at the last minute) they formed a
team to lobby Megawati for NU positions in the cabinet. If he did,
they formed a "think tank" to "advise" Gus Dur (Interview with
Kyai Imron lHamzah, Oct.22,1,gg9) .
In the end, in a two-phased voting sequence that was full of last
minute shifts, negotiations and maneuvers, \7ahid was elected Presi-
dent with a narrow margin-373 for \Vahid,3l3 f.or Megawati, and 5
abstentions. Vhile the Islamic factions erupted in shouts of "Allahu
akbar", the prevailing sentiment within NU and PKB was surprise,
and deep ambivalence. \ilhile they were at one level delighted that
their leader had succeeded, and were pleased about the inevitable
benefit this would bring to NlJ, at another level many were deeply
anxious about 'Wahid's ability to perform as President, and many
expressed sentiments such as "If Gus Dur fails, NU will be destroyed
and will not be able to rise again for a very long time," ( Interviews
with PKB members, 23 October, 7999 ).
In November 1999, NU held its 30'h Muktamar, or National Con-
gress, in Lirboyo, East Java. This was a pivotal point in NU history
not only because at this Muktamar NU would elect a replacement
for'$ilahid, who had led NU for the past 15 years, but also because
NU would have to make a decision on its own relationship with the
political system. That is, it would have to decide whether to contin-
ue to implement Khittah'26, and permit its members to be active in
any party, or to formally endorse PKB as NU's only party.In the
months leading up to the Muktamar this issue was discussed at vari-
ous seminars and preliminary meetings.
Perhaps because of all the build-up and discussion leading up to it,
the Muktamar itself seemed somewhat anticlimactic. Because of the
internal politicking going on, it was highly chaotic and extremely
unorganized. Discussion of central issues of policy and identity were
overshadowed by campaigns for the leadership of NU. Nevertheless,
some important decisions were made. Firstly, the Organization com-
mittee made a historic decision to switch the ideological basis of NU
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from the Pancasila to Islam. Secondly, NU did not officially ,,en-
dorse" PKB, but retained the freedom outlined in Khittah '26 to be
involved in any pafiy, with an ambiguous cavear that NU members
should "consider the historical and emorional ties of NU with pKB".
The anticlimax'was in the complete lack of debate on the issue of the
Khittah '26. Toued as the mosr contentious issue ro be discussed
several months before the Muktamar, there was almost no formal or
informal debate on the Khittah '26 as such. \7hile obviously the issue
of the relationship berween PKB and NU is directly related to the
Khittah '26,the fact that this debate took place without reference ro
it indicates to me that the powers that be within the leadership of
NU, who also determined the agenda and conrenr of the Muktamar
discussions, realized that any formal recognition of a relationship
between NU and PKB would violate the spirit and essence of the
Khittah-a fact which was recognized by many Muktamar partici-
pants as well. Thus, in order to achieve their political goals while
also at the same time maintaining rhe sacrosanct sratus of Khittah
'26, it was removed from the agenda as an item of discussion.
One final significant development of the 1999 Muktamar was rhe
heightened "Islamic" tone of the results. This was reflected in several
important decisions. one was the decision, raken by the Bahtsul Masail
committee (a committee of senior ulama which issue fatwa-like scrio-
turally-based decisions) to mengharamkan (forbid) inter-religious
prayer meetings of the kind frequently held at Abdurrahman \Wa-
hid's home in Ciganjur before he became President. This kind of
event was deemed to be in conflict with the syari'ab, and therefore
baram. A second example, was rhe decision, also taken by the Baht-
sul Masail committee, that it was baram for a non-Muslim to be a
political leader in Indonesia. A third example, mentioned above, was
the reinstatement of Islam as NIJ's fundamental ideological founda-
tion, rather than Pancasila.
These decisions not only reveal a move to have a more visible and
symbolic expression of Islam on the part of NU, but also represenr a
fairly dramatic change in direction, away from the religiously toler-
ant, nationally oriented, and pluralist discourse promoted by Vahid
and his followers over the pasr 15 years. Many of the young NU
activists and intellectuals saw these decisions as representing a huge
step back for NU. As one young intellectual said, "These decisions
undermine the values that we've been struggling for over rhe past 15
years," (personal communication with Syafiq Hasyim, 28 November
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1999). On the other hand, it can also be argued that this move rePre-
senrs rhe results of internal democratization within NU. It is well
known that many of the mid-to-low level kTai and ulama, who make
up the quantitative if not qualitative substance of NU' do not agree
with Vahid's efforts to revitalize and in some cases revolutionize
traditionalist Islam. Furthermore it is also true that the discourse of
civil society, secular government and religious tolerance is an elite
discourse, prevailing largely within the urban-based, young genera-
tion of intellectuals and activists, with the exception of a few notable
kTai.Thus,as \ilahid steps down from his position of almost suPreme
authority within NU, and in the context of a general heightening of
Islamic acriviry and public presence nationally, it may be that NU is
articulating a position that is more reflective of the majoriry of its
ulama, rather than the elite intellectuals that have been influential
over the past 15 years.
Conclusion
NU has always been a political organization \Thether or not its
political maneuvers are conducted in the interests of protecting and
maintaining a particular religious tradition is the subject of another
paper. Many scholars have argued that Sunni reners call for at the
,r"iy l"rtt cooperation with political powers and more commonly
active involvement in positions of political power in order to Protect
and maintain religious pfactice. There also is a long-standing debate
about whether religious politicians use politics in the interests of re-
ligion, or religion to legitimize their political interests. My purpose
here is not to debate issues of motivation, but merely to argue that
NU, while it calls itself a socio-religious organization, is also a polit-
ical organization. It has survived throughout the history of Indonesia
like no other political or religious org^rlLzation, being cooperative
with the regirne in power when necessary, being oppositional when
it can ger a.way with it, but playing whatever political game it re-
quires to ,.rruirr.. Abdurrahman'$rahid's paradigm of "cultural Is-
lam,, is a political maneuver in itself, and his discourse of tolerance
and pluralism, while I believe sincere, is a discourse which is largely
limiied to an elite group of intellectuals and acrivisrs. Now, with
\rahid no longer af the helm of NlJ, at least formally, a form of
political Islam which may be more historically authentic and repre-
sentative of the majority of NU ulama may emerge.
\rith regard to NIJ's relationship to the srare, an approach of "in-
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formal politics" or "politik tanpa pangung" (politics without a plat-
form) is no longer necessary, as NU perhaps for the first time in its
history is able to dominate the political bureaucracy and government.
The question on everyone's mind now is, having spent the last 15
years becoming the most vocal critical voice in civil society, will NU
be able to remain critical, and maintain its position as the primary
motor behind civil society development in Indonesia? It is too early
to answer that question definitively at this point, however I suspect
that it will be very difficult for NU to maintain its critical stance. ks
history of political accommodationism, combined with strong theo-
logical justifications for cooperating with the state, especially a state
which is sympathetic to its interests, provide a strong pull in that
direction. Furthermore, the NU intellectuals and activists who have
the skills and the ability to play a critical, watchdog function are also
'Wahid's 
"AnAh buah" (ptrot6g6s), and the social and cultural pressure
on them to support Vahid, and the regime that \7ahid currently
leads, is immense.
In 1972, Daniel Lev wrote that Islam in Indonesia "has always
suffered from a kind of minority status. Despite the fact that Muslims
are a numerical majority, Islam in Indonesia represents what is basi-
cally an under class," (1.972: 2a2). Vlhtle many Muslim intellectuals
and activists still claim that Muslims are marginalized within power
structures in Indonesia, Islam can no longer truly be considered an
"under class" in Indonesia. The public discourse and space in Indone-
sia is strongly colored by Islam, with public speeches almost always
commenced by "assalamu'alaikum", public events structured around
the five datly prayer times, and jilbabs (headcovering) abounding.
\7ahid is in the somewhat tricky position of needing to accommo-
date members of the modernist Poros Tengah who facilitated his rise
to power, and who would like to see this public expression of Islam
extended to a more explicit political role, while maintaining his own
long-held commitment to a "secular" government. If NU, which has
been his power base heretofore in this struggle, is beginning to shift
itself to a more Islamist position, he may be facing quite a challenge.
On the other hand, very few people actually expected Vahid to get
this far, so at this stage, all bets are on.
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Endnotes
1. The Pancasila is the Indonesian state ideology, consisting of 5 Principles: 1) be-
lief in one God, 2) humanitarianism, 3) national unity, 4) democracy through
consultation and consensus, and 5) social justice. It was originally conceptual-
izedby Soekarno, and later resuscitated as an instrument of organizational con-
trol by Soeharto. In 1.982 he decreed that all "mass organizations" and "sosio-
politicai organizations" must have Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation
of their organization.
2. Masyumi was an umbreila Islamic party, and the primary vehicle for Islamic
politics in the 1940s and '50s. \With the withdrawal of NU, it became known as
a modernist party. It was disbanded by Soeharto in 1950.
3. "Modernist" and "traditionalist" are problematic but widely used labels to de-
scribe two main "streams" of Islam in Indonesia. "Modernists" are largely urban-
based Muslims, who refer only to the Qur'an and hadist for divine guidance,
while "traditionalists" are Iargely rurai-based Muslims, who adhere to decisions
of ulama from the classical era, as handed dovzn within four primary madzhab,
or schools of 
.jurisprudence.
4. In theJune 1999 general elections, for example, the poiitical lines within Islam
remained the same, though they have diversified internally-there were 3 par-
ties claiming to represent the o1d Masyumi electorate and agenda (PMB, PPIM,
PBB), while 4 parties held claim to the NU electoral base (PKB, PKU, PNU,
and SUNI).
5. NU organizational structure involves a dual-leadership position: theRais Am is
chair of the Syuriah (religious council) and the ketua, or general chairman, is
head of the Tanfidziah (administrative body).
6. The configuration of the sides of this debate would also reverse itself later. In
this instance the head of the Tanfidziyah was calling for a return to a socio-
religious focus while the head of the Syuriah advocated a role for NU in formal
politics-in the early 1980s it would be the Tanfidziyah attempting to maintain
a political role for NU, while senior ulama and members of the Syuriah would
call for a return to a socio-religious focus.
7. Guided Democracy was the period of time from 1959 to 1965 in which Presi
dent Soekarno accrued a great deal of personal power' dismantled the parlia-
mentary system, and became more directive in the leadership of the country.
8. For an extensive discussion of this process, see Daniel Lev, 7996, The Transition
to Guided Democracy in Indonesia 1957-1959.Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia
Project Monograph Series.
9. PBNU, or Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, is the Central Board of the NU.
NU organizational structure consists of this Central Board, which is composed
of the Tanfidziyah (administrative council) and the Syuriah (religious council)
as well as the Mustasyar (advisors). This leadership structure is replicated at the
provincial level (PVNU) and at the kabupaten (district) level (PCNU). Leader-
ship hierarchy is fairly rigid within NU, with most decisions made by the PBNU,
and merely passed down to , and implemented by, the PW and PC bodies'
10. The Jakana Charter.was a document drafted in June of 1945 in an attempt to
break a similar deadlock over the basis of the state upon its formation. The
contested passage stated that "Indonesia ...is based upon: Belief in One Supreme
God with the obligation to c rry out the Syariat for adherents of Islam...". The
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lasr seven v/ords v/ere the source of fierce debate, with Muslims interpreting
them as giving the responsibiliry for impiementation of rhe syari'ah ro rhe srare,
while non-Muslims viewed this as a personal religious obligation. In 1945 this
issue was finally resolved, unsatisfactorily to some, by eliminating the conten-
tious seven words from the Jakarta Charter, which was placed in the Preamble
of the Constitution.
11. \fhile often seen as a split between the "politicians"-ie the Cipete group, refer-
ring to Chalid's home in the Jakarta suburb of Cipete, and the "ulama"-ie the
Situbondo group, referring to the home of Kiai As'ad, an influential kiai who
led the push away from formal politics in the late 1970s, the actual configuration
of interests was more compiex. \Tithin the Situbondo grouP there was a sub-
group of 'radical'poiiticians led by Yusuf Hasyim among others' who had been
recently removed from their positions in the DPR due to their oppositional
srance, who coexisted with another subgroup of "progressive" intellectuals, such
as Abdurrahman tVahid, Muchit Muzadi' Said Budairy, etc. who were sPear-
heading an intellectual revival within NU. These rwo groups would eventually
face off themselves, but at this time were joined in their effons to remove NIJ
from PPP. For a more exrensive discussion of this period, see Feillard 7999:227-
232.
12. Lt this Congress Siddiq was elected as Rais Am, and lfahid 
^s 
Ketut.
13. See footnote 1.
14. For a close look at Achmad siddiq's line of argumenration, see Islam, Pancasila
dan Ukhuu)ah Islamiyah, a small book based on a series of interviews with Kyai
Siddiq on this topic. For a short English-language discussion of this book, see
Barton 1996: 11.9'128.
15. \7hi1e this move was consistently articulated as a "return to" NU's "original"
state of emphasis on the social rather than the political, the observation has been
made that in fact NU was birthed in a highly political conrexr and had a well-
developed political agenda at the time (Suryanegara, 1994). Furthermore, it should
be remembered that this 'withdrawal' from formal politics was the explicit aim
of one faction within NU.
16. This was widely felt to be due to the personal "charisma", power, and genealog-
ical clout of Abdurrahman \Wahid within NU, in that as long as he occupied the
position of ketua Tanfidziyah, any other formal position within NU, including
th" R"i, Am of the Syuriah, would automatically come second. Vhile this was
widely acknowledged in private, I heard it openly discussed for the first time
oniy at NU's Muktamar (National Congress) in 1999, after Vahid had stepped
down from this position.
17. In the early l97As Dan Lev wrote that Muslim leaders were loathe to discuss the
political and ideological differences between them (referring to the modernist
vs. traditionalist divide) publicly, for iear of "showing weakness to rhe non-
Islamicopposition." (Lev, IslamicCourts,p.2a6). Thefactthatthisisnolonger
the case, that there is much public discussion of these differences is possibly in
part due to Vahid's outspokenness on this issue of "political Islam". \rahid would
not need to fear the "non-Islamic opposition" because in his paradigm' non-
Muslims are rarely rhe opposition.
1g. The sudden and highly visible prominence of Islam on the public scene immedi-
arcly after Soeharto's fall was only an acceleration of a process of growing pubiic
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expression of Islam in Indonesia. Some mark this growth from the early 1990s,
with the establishment of ICMI, others from the mid to late 1980s, however it is
interesting to note that Lev, writing in 1971', is already observing an increase in
observation of public rituals of Islam, such as fasting, praying at the mosque, etc.
(Lev,1,972:262)
19. This explosion of "political Islam" had been predicted by \filliam Liddle, among
others, several years before the fall of the New Order when he argued that the
prominence of moderate Islam in Indonesia was Partially a product of New
Order suppression. He wrote, ".-.the success of the substantiality...has been too
dependent on the support of authoritarian politicians whose needs happen to
have coincided with theirs. In a more open or democratic political climate.-.it is
probable that the scripturalists would have many more political resources, in
mass acceptance of their ideas...than they have now." (Liddle 1996: 284).
20. Clear echoes here, again, of the nationalist,/traditionalist vs. modernist face-off
that existed in the 1950s.
21.. The surprise here was largely due to the personal enmity and hostility that exist-
ed between \ilahid and Rais. This hostility not only reflected the historic divide
between the modernists and traditionalists which each man represented, but
also an antagonism between them on a personal level. During the 'reformasi'
L.:;.0, 
this antagonism foiled several attempts to create a joint reform plat-
22. This was possibly because many of the kyai had deep reservations about \Wahid's
ability to perform as President, based on his erraticism and frequent controver-
sial statements. These reservations were compounded by the fact that ideologi-
cally many of the kyai did not approve of $7ahid's effons at theological renewal
within NU. On the other hand, many of the younger generation PKB politi-
cians were not only related to Vahid (Muhaimin Iskandar, for example), but
most of them owed their careers and their positions to \Wahid.
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